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Abstract
Lysander	Spooner	(1808-1887)	–	a	self-taught	lawyer	whose	opinions	have	been	
quoted by the Supreme Court of the United States, a private entrepreneur challeng-
ing government monopolies, and a doyen of American individualism, is currently 
known	mainly	as	a	 trenchant	critic	of	 the	United	States	Constitution,	who	openly	
contested	its	legitimacy.	His	early	abolitionist	works,	in	which	he	argued	that	slavery	
was	illegal	under	the	Constitution,	are	far	less	known	but	equally	thought-provoking	
and important. The aim of this paper is to analyze the evolution of Spooner’s politi-
cal	stance	from	the	most	influential	exponent	of	the	antislavery	constitutionalism	to	
an	anarchist	who	demanded	the	abolition	of	constitution,	as	well	as	to	mark	out	the	
limits he tried to put on the social compact. 
Keywords: Lysander Spooner, antislavery constitutionalism, anarchism.
Resumen
Lysander Spooner (1808-1887) – un abogado autodidacta cuyas opiniones han 
sido citadas por la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, un empresario privado que 
desafió	los	monopolios	del	gobierno	y	un	decano	del	individualismo	americano,	es	
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principalmente conocido en la actualidad como un incisivo crítico de la Constitución 
de los Estados Unidos que puso abiertamente en cuestión su legitimidad. Sus prim-
eros trabajos abolicionistas, en los que argumentó sobre la ilegalidad de la esclavi-
tud de acuerdo con la Constitución, son mucho menos conocidos, pero igualmente 
relevantes	y	merecedores	de	 reflexión.	El	propósito	de	este	artículo	es	analizar	 la	
evolución de la posición política de Spooner, evolución en virtud de la cual, de ser 
el	exponente	más	influyente	del	constitucionalismo	antiesclavista,	pasó	a	convertirse	
en un anarquista que reclamaba la abolición de la constitución, así como a delinear 
los límites que pretendía aplicar al pacto social. 
Palabras clave: Lysander Spooner, constitucionalismo antiesclavista, anarquis-
mo. 
1.	Lysander	Spooner	(1808-1887)	–	a	self-taught	lawyer	whose	opinions	have	been	
quoted by the Supreme Court of the United States1, a private entrepreneur challeng-
ing government monopolies, and a doyen of American individualism, is currently 
known	mainly	as	a	 trenchant	critic	of	 the	United	States	Constitution,	who	openly	
contested	its	legitimacy.	His	early	abolitionist	works,	in	which	he	argued	that	slavery	
was	illegal	under	the	Constitution,	are	far	less	known	but	equally	thought-provoking	
and important. The aim of this paper is to analyze the evolution of Spooner’s politi-
cal	stance	from	the	most	influential	exponent	of	the	antislavery	constitutionalism	to	
an	anarchist	who	demanded	the	abolition	of	constitution,	and	to	mark	out	the	limits	
he tried to put on the social compact. 
The	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	II	contains	a	short	intellectual	biogra-
phy	of	Spooner	and	places	him	in	the	wider	milieu	of	the	nineteenth	century	Ameri-
can	radical	individualism.	Section	III	presents	an	overview	of	the	ideas	developed	in	
the	major	Spooner’s	anti-slavery	writings	and	contrasts	them	with	the	views	of	the	
anti-constitutional	wing	of	the	abolitionist	movement.	Section	IV	outlines	Spooner’s	
postbellum political	stance,	and	traces	the	changes	his	ideas	went	through	over	the	
years	in	between	the	publication	of	his	two	most	influential	works	-	The Unconstitu-
tionality of Slavery (1860) and No Treason No. VI. The Constitution of No Authority 
(1870). Section V concludes the paper.  
1 See: e.g. J. J. Martin, Men Against the State. The Expositors of Individualist Anarchism in America 
1827-1908. Colorado Springs, CO, Ralph Myles, 1970, pp. 167-201 and S. J. Shone, Lysander Spooner: 
American Anarchist, Lanham, MA, Lexington Books, 2010.
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2. Lysander	 Spooner	was	 born	 on	 January	 19th, 1808 on the Athol farm, Massa-
chusetts,2 about 110 kilometers West of Boston.3	He	was	 the	second	child	of	Asa	
and Dolly Spooner, an unorthodox Puritan couple that made its living on farming. 
He	was	bound	with	his	father	by	a	contract	stating	that	he	had	to	work	for	the	full	
costs	of	his	raising	and	hence,	spent	the	first	25	years	of	his	life	on	his	father’s	farm.	
Despite	 the	 lack	 of	 formal	 education,	 Spooner	 acquired	 a	 comprehensive	 knowl-
edge	that	enabled	him	to	become	a	local	school	teacher.	After	meeting	all	financial	
commitments	presented	in	the	contract,	in	1833	he	moved	to	Worcester.	At	first,	he	
worked	in	a	notarial	office	and	then	he	started	practice	in	the	law	office	of	John	Davis	
and Charles Allen.4
After	three	years	of	practice,	with	the	permission	from	his	patrons,	he	decided	to	
open	his	own	office,	which	was	an	act	against	the	state	law	ruling	that	a	future	lawyer	
who	had	not	graduated	from	college	was	obliged	to	undergo	five	years	of	practice.	
Simultaneously,	in	a	local	newspaper,	he	published	an	open	letter	to	the	members	of	
the	state	legislature	urging	them	to	lift	regulations	that	artificially	limited	free	com-
petition on the market for legal services.5	His	one-man	campaign	drew	a	positive	
reaction	from	local	prominent	politicians	which	resulted	in	establishing	a	new	bill	
that	changed	the	requirements	in	the	field	and	which	involved	Spooner’s	postulates.	
Despite	that	fact,	his	legal	career	did	not	flourish.	Because	of	two	pamphlets	criti-
cizing Christianity and clergy from deistic perspective,6	 he	 had	 great	 difficulties	
attracting	new	clients.
Since	he	was	unable	to	make	a	living,	after	two	years	of	independent	practice,	he	
decided	to	move	to	New	York,	where	he	was	employed	by	Albert	Gallatin	(future	
US	Secretary	of	the	Treasury)	at	the	National	Bank	of	New	York	City.	After	a	couple	
of months he managed to accumulate resources he planned to invest in the eighty-
acre	piece	of	land	in	Ohio.	He	wished	to	sell	it	with	profit	to	the	arriving	settlers,	
however,	his	plans	were	destroyed	by	the	decision	of	the	state	legislature	to	build	
a	shipping	route	between	Indiana	and	the	Eire	lake,	far	from	the	land	that	he	had	
2	If	it	is	not	stated	otherwise,	all	biographical	information	comes	from	C.	Shively,	Critical Biography 
of Lysander Spooner, in: idem (ed.) The Collected Works of Lysander Spooner, Weston, MA, M&S 
Press,	1971,	vol.	1,	pp.	15-62.	It	is	worth	nothing	that	contrary	to	the	title	and	information	provided	in	
the introduction to this book, the six-volume collection of almost 2400 pages does not contain all of the 
works	written	by	Spooner	–	its	most	significant	omission	is	an	essay	Vices are not Crimes. A Vindication 
of Moral Liberty published anonymously in 1875.
3 R. Barnett, “In Search of Lysander Spooner”, in Liberty 13, 1999, pp. 43-46.
4	The	future	Massachusetts	governor	as	well	as	the	member	of	the	US	House	of	Representatives	for	
two	terms	of	office,	and	the	future	Attorney	General	of	Massachusetts	(respectively).
5 L. Spooner, “To the Members of the Legislature of Massachusetts”, in  Worcester Republican, 
26.08.1835.
6 L. Spooner, The Deist’s Immortality, and an Essay on Man’s Accountability for his Belief, Boston, 
MA,	1834;	Idem, The Deist’s Reply to the Alleged Supernatural Evidences of Christianity, Boston, MA, 
1836.
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purchased. Spooner made an unsuccessful attempt to block the investment using his 
legal skills,7	however,	the	economic	crash	of	the	1837	(Panic	of	1837)8 ruined his 
undertaking	completely.	When	he	lost	all	of	his	wealth,	he	decided	to	go	back	to	his	
family farm.
The	 financial	 failure	 and	 developing	 crash	 of	 the	 American	 economy	 made	
Spooner look more closely at the economic issues, especially those concerning 
banks	and	other	credit	institutions	that	were	blamed	for	the	1837	crisis	by	most	of	
his	contemporary	commentators.	He	drew	the	conclusion	that	the	cause	of	the	crash	
was	the	“money	monopoly”	which	gave	the	right	to	issue	promissory	notes	only	to	
corporations	who	fulfilled	certain	requirements	prescribed	by	the	law.	He	then	de-
cided	to	undertake	the	endeavor	to	prove	the	unconstitutionality	of	all	laws	violating	
the	freedom	of	contract	in	the	field	of	the	finances.	According	to	Spooner,	“To	issue	
bills	of	credit,	that	is,	promissory	notes,	is	a	natural	right.	[...]	It	is	one	that	the	state	
governments	cannot	take	from	their	citizens,	and	all	those	laws,	which	have	attempt-
ed to deprive them of this right, are unconstitutional. The act of incorporation, then, 
gives	no	new	right	in	this	respect”.9
In	the	future,	he	would	elaborate	on	that	idea	by	designing	an	original	monetary	
system	in	which	each	individual	would	have	the	right	to	issue	their	own	money	and	
participate	in	lending	activities	based	on	their	private	wealth.10 He believed that the 
banking	system	he	postulated	would	promote	self-employment,	financial	independ-
ence	and	that	it	would	balance	the	distribution	of	material	goods	by	the	market.	This,	
in	turn,	would	contribute	to	harmonizing	the	society	and	eliminating	the	class	con-
flict	which	was	the	result	of	economic	inequalities	much	greater	than	those	resulting	
from “natural and necessary causes.”11 The overgrown rich,12 as he referred to those 
7 Spooner v. McConnell, 22 F 939, 943. This case is the subject of an anonymous essay Spooner vs. 
McConnell et al., An Argument Presented to the United States Circuit Court in Support of a Petition for 
an Injunction to restrain Alexander McConnell and Others from Placing Dams in the Maumee River 
Ohio, n. p., 1839.
8	Today,	the	region	once	owned	by	Spooner	constitutes	a	small	village,	Grand	Rapids	(Wood	County,	
OH)	with	965	citizens.
9 L. Spooner, Constitutional Law Relative to Credit, Currency and Banking, Worcester, MA, 1843, 
p. 24.
10 Idem, A New System of Paper Currency, Boston, MA, 1861; Idem, A New Banking System: The 
Needful Capital for Rebuilding the Burnt District, Boston, MA, 1873; Idem, The Law of Prices: A 
Demonstration of the Necessity for an Infinite Increase in Money, Boston, MA, 1877; Idem, Gold 
and Silver as Standards of Value, Boston, MA, 1878. For the analysis of Spooner’s reflections on the 
banking system from the libertarian perspective, see: M. N. Rothbard, “The Spooner-Tucker Doctrine, 
An Economist’s View”, in Idem, Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays, ed. 2, 
Auburn, AL, 2000, pp. 205-218.
11 L. Spooner, Poverty: Its Illegal Causes and Legal Cure, Boston, MA, 1846, p. 41. See also: Idem, 
Our Financiers, Their Ignorance, Usurpations and Frauds, Boston, MA, 1877 and Idem, Universal 
Wealth Shown to be Easily Attainable, Boston, MA, 1879.
12 L. Spooner, Poverty..., op. cit, p. 41.
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who	came	into	possession	of	their	wealth	through	the	money	monopoly	established	
in	their	interest,	could	not	act	justly	towards	the	poor	and	vice versa, since justice 
requires close relations, the understanding of the needs and sharing life experiences. 
When	those	requirements	are	not	fulfilled,	“the	rich	will	often	defraud,	oppress,	amid	
insult	the	poor,	and	the	poor	defraud	and	commit	violence	upon	the	rich,	with	less	
compunction	than	the	same	individuals	would	have	defrauded,	injured,	or	insulted	
one	of	their	own	number.	And	every	man,	who	will	defraud	others	at	all,	will	more	
willingly	defraud	a	stranger	than	an	acquaintance”.13 The freedom of issuing money 
and	entering	into	contracts	on	all	conditions	accepted	by	the	parties	involved	would	
lead	to	relative	financial	equality,	elimination	of	“casts”,	it	would	bring	people	closer	
to one another and spread such experiences that “being common to all, enables [an 
individual]	to	sympathize	with	all,	and	insures	to	himself	the	sympathy	of	all.	And	
thus	the	social	virtues	of	mankind	would	be	greatly	increased”.14
Spooner’s	activity	 in	 the	field	of	 the	so-called	free	banking	did	not	go	beyond	
the	theoretical	reflections	–	his	pursuit	to	create	a	new	kind	of	financial	institution	
was	fruitless.	His	next	attempt	at	challenging	the	government	monopoly,	this	time	
in	postal	services,	was	more	successful,	although	short	lived.	In	1844	Spooner	cre-
ated	American	Letter	Main	Company	(ALMC),	whose	aim	was	transporting	letters	
between	Boston	and	New	York	and,	later	on,	between	Philadelphia	and	Baltimore	as	
well.	This	was,	once	again,	an	enterprise	undertaken	against	the	federal	law,	which	
banned individuals from delivering parcels other than periodicals in exchange for 
money.	It	was	not	the	first	company	of	this	kind,15	however	none	of	the	others	chal-
lenged	the	law	so	openly.	Spooner	not	only	advertised	his	services	in	local	papers	
–	clearly	stating	that	one	of	the	company’s	aims	was	to	test	“the	constitutional	right	
of free competition in the business of carrying letters” – but he also sent a letter to 
the	Post	Master	General	of	the	United	States	in	which	he	informed	the	latter	about	
undertaking	this	enterprise	and	revealing	his	whereabouts	 in	case	 the	government	
would	like	to	issue	a	lawsuit	against	him.16	The	letter	was	accompanied	with	a	pam-
phlet	 in	which	Spooner	aimed	 to	prove	 that	 the	Article	1,	Section	8,	Clause	7	of	
the	US	Constitution,	which	enabled	the	Congress	to	establish	Post	Offices	and	post	
roads, could not be basis for introducing legal constraints on the competition on the 
postal market.17
13   Ibidem, p. 46.
14 Ibidem, p. 47.
15 See: R. R. Jr. John, “Private Mail Delivery in the United States During the Nineteenth Century: A 
Sketch”, in Business and Economic History 15,  1986, pp. 135-147 and K. B. Olds, “The Challenge to 
the Postal Monopoly, 1839-1851”, in Cato Journal 15,  1995, pp. 1-24.
16 L. Spooner, A Letter to Honorable Charles A. Wickcliffe, Postmaster General U.S,  11.01.1844, 
retrieved 28 February 2016 from: http://static1.squarespace.com/static/55a3c833e4b07c31913e6eae/t/
55a516dce4b08efc48d5f7e6/1436882652806/LT130.pdf.
17 L. Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of the Laws of Congress Prohibiting Private Mails, New York, 
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At	 first,	 the	 government	 reacted	 to	 Spooner’s	 challenge	 by	 extralegal	means:	
since		it	could	not	compete	with	his	company	in	terms	of	prices	–	ALMC	was	selling	
stamps	for	5	cents/each	which	was	almost	three	times	less	than	the	price	offered	by	
the	US	Post	Office,	who	delivered	mail	on	the	same	distance	for	14.5	cents18 – the 
Postmaster General started to put pressure on the transport companies that Spoon-
er	cooperated	with,	threatening	to	terminate	their	contracts,	in	order	to	make	them	
break	their	contracts	with	Spooner.	However,	when	these	actions	proved	insufficient	
and other private mail companies started to emerge, the US Congress decided to 
amend	the	law	and	criminalize	the	private,	for-profit	delivery	of	parcels	(The	Post	
Office	Reform	Act	of	1845),	simultaneously	lowering	the	official	prices	to	the	level	
of that offered by the ALMC.19	Spooner	wished	to	file	a	lawsuit	and	pursuit	 legal	
recourse,	but	the	increasing	sum	of	fines	he	needed	to	pay	and	the	growing	number	
of	arrests	of	his	couriers	and	confiscation	of	parcels	forced	him	to	close	the	compa-
ny after several months. Despite being unable to challenge the constitutionality of 
the	U.S.	postal	monopoly			Spooner	did	find	satisfaction	in	the	fact	that	he	played	
a	significant	role	in	the	process	of	lowering	the	official	postage	rates.	He	was	even	
posthumously named “the father of cheap postage in America”20.
The economic failure of the ALMC forced Spooner to go back to his family farm 
once	 again.	 In	Athol,	 owing	 to	 the	 support	 of	 his	 friend,	 a	 rich	 entrepreneur	 and	
a	philanthropist,	Gerrit	Smith	 (1797-1874)	who	financed	many	progressive	social	
causes,	he	decided	to	undertake	even	more	difficult	task	–	to	prove	the	unconstitu-
tionality	of	“our	peculiar	institution”	as	slavery	was	known	in	the	American	South.21 
Thereby, he put himself in opposition not only to the dominant legal doctrine of 
his	time,	but	also	to	the	mainstream	abolitionist	movement	which	following	Lloyd	
Garrison (1805-1879) – the founder of the American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS) 
and the tireless publisher of The Liberator22 – assumed that the American Constitu-
tion	by	sanctioning	slavery	was	equal	to	“a	covenant	with	death,	an	agreement	with	
hell.”23 Spooner’s monograph, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery,	which	was	 the	
crowning	of	long-lasting	research	(and	which	will	be	described	in	more	detail	in	the	
next section of this paper) caused a stir among all factions involved in the dispute 
over	 slavery.	 Its	main	 theses	were	 cited	during	 the	Congress	 sessions,24 and they 
NY, 1844.
18 At that time, there were no unified prices in all states.
19 R. R. Jr. John, op. cit., pp. 142-143.
20 J. J. Martin, op. cit., pp. 171-172.
21 K. M. Stampp,The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South, New York, NY, A.A. 
Knopf, 1967.
22 H. Mayer, All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery, New York, NY, St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998.
23 Resolution of the American Anti-Slavery Society of 27.01.1843.
24 Congressional Globe, 30th Congress, 1st Sess., (1847, Appendix: 45) and Congressional Globe, 
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drew	a	positive	response	from	Frederick	Douglass	(1818-1895),	a	former	slave	and	
an iconic activist of the abolitionist movement,25	who,	under	the	influence	of	Spoon-
er’s	work,	rejected	Garrison’s	interpretation	of	the	federal	Constitution.26	His	work	
also made some radical abolitionists re-evaluate their stance on the constitutional 
status of slavery.27	Liberty	Party	–	a	new	political	group	of	former	members	of	the	
AASS	who	aimed	at	abolishing	slavery	through	the	electoral	politics28	–	officially	
approved the arguments presented in The Unconstitutionality of Slavery and made a 
proposal	of	candidacy	from	their	party	to	Spooner.	However,	much	to	the	surprise	of	
the reformist fraction of abolitionist, the latter categorically refused, claiming he is 
opposed the ”political machinery” based on the claim that the majority had the right 
to dictate the rules of behavior.29	Later,	while	analyzing	the	suffragettes’	postulates,	
with	whom	he	agreed	with	regard	to	the	socio-economic	status	of	women,	he	would	
state	that	it	was	not	women	who	should	gain	the	right	to	vote,	but	it	was	men	who	
should lose them.30
According	to	Spooner,	the	right	way	to	abolish	“the	peculiar	institution”	was	to	
convince	the	judges	that	it	was	unconstitutional.	If	they	were	not	willing	to	accept	
arguments presented in The Unconstitutionality of Slavery,	he	saw	a	chance	in	jury 
nullification –	a	rarely	used	common	law	institution	which	gives	a	jury	the	power	to	
acquit	an	individual	guilty	of	crime	if	they	believe	the	relevant	law	to	be	unjust.31 A 
consistent	use	of	this	power	would	enable	the	slaves	that	escaped	to	the	North	and	
those	who	were	helping	 them	 to	 avoid	punishment,	which	 in	 the	 long-run	would	
make	it	impossible	for	the	slave-owners	to	keep	their	slaves	in	captivity.32 
In	extreme	situations,	Spooner	allowed	for	the	use	of	force	against	the	slavehold-
ers.	He	wrote:	“the	state	of	Slavery	is	a	state	of	war.	In	this	case	it	is	a	just	war,	on	the	
part	of	the	negroes	–	a	war	for	liberty,	and	the	recompense	of	injuries;	and	necessity	
justifies	them	in	carrying	it	on	by	the	only	means	their	oppressors	have	left	to	them.	
In	war,	the	plunder	of	enemies	is	as	legitimate	as	the	killing	of	them;	and	stratagem	
is	as	legitimate	as	open	force.	The	right	of	the	Slaves,	therefore,	in	this	war,	to	take	
34th Congress, 3rd Sess. (1854, Appendix: 14).
25 N. Buccola, The Political Thought of Frederick Douglass: In Pursuit of American Liberty, New 
York, NY, NYU Press, 2012.
26 F. Douglass, “Change of Opinion Announced”, in The Liberator, 1851.
27 W. Phillips, Review of Lysander Spooner’s Essay on the Unconstitutionality of Slavery, Boston, MA, 
1847.
28 R. O. Johnson, The Liberty Party, 1840–1848: Antislavery Third-Party Politics in the United States. 
Baton Rouge, LA, Louisiana State University Press, 2009.
29 L. Spooner, Letter to G. Bradburn, Retrieved February 28, 2016 from: http://static1.squarespace.
com/static/55a3c833e4b07c31913e6eae/t/55a3f9d8e4b0f21644223dbb/1436809688848/NY55.pdf
30 L. Spooner, “Against Woman Suffrage”, in Liberty 22, 1882, p. 4.
31 L. Spooner, An Essay on the Trial by Jury, Boston, MA, 1852.
32 Spooner himself defended runaway slaves and people who were helping them in front of the judges, 
pro publico bono, on more than one occasion. See: C. Shively, op. cit., chapter 6.
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property,	is	as	clear	as	their	right	to	take	life;	and	their	right	to	do	it	secretly,	is	as	
clear	as	their	right	to	do	it	openly.	And	as	this	will	probably	be	their	most	effective	
mode of operation for the present, they ought to be taught, encouraged, and assisted 
to do it to the utmost, so long as they are unable to meet their enemies in the open 
field.33	It	was	not	just	an	empty	declaration.	In	1859	Spooner	consulted	the	plans	of	
the	attack	on	the	Harpers	Ferry	Armory	(Virginia)	prepared	by	John	Brown	(1800-
1859)	which	was	supposed	to	start	an	armed	revolution	of	 the	slaves.34 When the 
plans proved unsuccessful, he plotted an attempt to capture the governor of Virginia, 
who	was	to	be	exchanged	for	John	Brown	waiting	in	a	state	prison	cell	for	the	exe-
cution.35
In the second volume of The Unconstitutionality of Slavery,	written	as	a	response	
to	criticism	from	Wendell	Phillips,	a	lawyer	closely	associated	with	W.	L.	Garrison,	
Spooner’s	anti-statist	views	start	to	surface	for	the	first	time.	He	begins	to	perceive	
the	government	as	a	mechanism	of	dominance	of	the	well-organized	special	interest	
groups	that	defend	their	privileged	position	by	using	laws	which	violate	the	innate	
right of each individual to self-determination, regardless of their gender, race and 
ancestry.36	Further	radicalization	of	his	views	would	come	as	a	result	of	the	Amer-
ican Civil War.
Before the attack of the Southern militia on Fort Sumter, the majority of the radi-
cal	abolitionists	followed	the	AASS	slogan	seen	on	the	front	page	of	The Liberator: 
“No	Union	with	Slaveholders,”	and	advocated	immediate	breakdown	of	any	politi-
cal	and	economic	ties	with	states	that	legitimized	slavery.	The	actions	undertaken	by	
the	Confederates	changed	their	views.	Even	Garrison,	who	was	an	absolute	pacifist,	
claimed	the	war	was	justified.37	Spooner,	as	one	of	the	few	abolitionists,	adamantly	
opposed maintaining the Union by force. In his three-volume essay No Treason, 
referring both to the history of the struggle for the American independence and his 
own	constitutional	theories,	Spooner	aimed	to	prove	that	the	Southerners	who	pur-
sued secession from the United States did not commit treason.38	For	 the	one	who	
proclaims disobedience to a union established on the basis of (supposedly) voluntary 
33 L. Spooner, To the Non-Slaveholders of the South: A Plan for the Abolition of Slavery, b.m.w., 1858, 
p. 1. It is also noteworthy that Spooner saw revolution as the only way for the Irish to improve their 
position in the British Empire. See: L. Spooner, Revolution the Only Remedy for the Oppressed Classes 
of Ireland, England, and Other Parts of the British Empire. Boston, MA, 1880.
34 See: T. Horowitz, Midnight Rising: John Brown and the Raid That Sparked the Civil War. New York, 
NY, Picador, 2011 and J. Earle, John Brown’s Raid on Harpers Ferry: A Brief History with Documents, 
Boston, MA, Bedford Books, 2008.
35 Ultimately, the plan of this abduction was abandoned since it was impossible to get resources needed 
in such a short period of time.
36 See: e.g. L. Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, Part Second. Boston, MA, 1846, p. 142.
37 H. Mayer, op. cit., pp. 517-577.
38 L. Spooner,  No Treason I, Boston, MA, 1867; idem, No Treason II: The Constitution, Boston, MA, 
1867; idem, No Treason VI: The Constitution of No Authority, Boston, MA, 1870.
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agreement is not a traitor. Spooner’s analysis led him to a radical and iconoclastic 
conclusion – despite emancipation, “the number of slaves, instead of having been 
diminished	by	the	war,	has	been	greatly	increased;	for	a	man	thus	subjected	to	a	gov-
ernment	that	he	does	not	want	is	a	slave”39 and a Constitution that legitimizes this 
kind	of	slavery	violates	natural	law	and	therefore	cannot	be	binding	(this	issue	will	
be elaborated on in the section IV of this paper).
Because of his increasing radicalism, at the beginning of the eighth decade of 
the nineteenth century, Spooner decided join the group of individualist anarchists 
focused	around	the	Boston	biweekly	paper	Liberty published by Benjamin R. Tuck-
er (1854-1939).40	However,	even	 in	 this	par excellence eclectic circle of the sup-
porters of the “contractual society”,41	 he	 stood	 out	 with	 his	 originality	 of	 views	
and non-conformism. While most of the “Boston anarchists,” as Tucker’s support-
ers	were	 referred	 to,42	 remained	under	 the	 influence	of	Stirner’s	 egoism,	Spooner	
continued	to	advocate	for	natural	law	until	the	end	of	his	life.43 The paper Natural 
Law or the Science of Justice	published	in	1882	was	the	first	one	that	gave	him	in-
ternational recognition outside the abolitionist circles.44 Another issue that Spoon-
er	 and	 anarcho-individualists	 did	 not	 agree	 on	was	 the	 property	 right,	 especially	
the	ownership	of	land	and	the	intellectual	property.45 While Tucker and his closest 
colleagues	firmly	rejected	property	in	relation	to	immaterial	goods	and	they	accept-
ed	 land	ownership	only	when	 it	 fulfilled	 the	requirement	of	occupancy and use,46 
Spooner claimed both institutions not only as natural rights of an individual, but also 
as the sine qua non	 requirement	for	 the	existence	of	free	society,	whose	rejection	
would	be	equal	to	supporting	communism,	the	ideology	evoking	disdain	in	individ-
ualist anarchists circles.47
39 Idem, No Treason I, op. cit., p. 5.
40 W. McElroy, The Debates of Liberty. An Overview of Individualist Anarchism 1881-1908, Lanham, 
MD, Lexington Books, 2002. See also: idem, “Benjamin Tucker, Individualism, & Liberty: Not the 
Daughter but the Mother of Order”, in Literature of Liberty 4, 1981, pp. 7-39.
41 See: e.g. B. R. Tucker, “The Relation of the State to the Individual”, in Individual Liberty. Selections 
from the Writings of Benjamin R. Tucker, New York, NY, CreateSpace, 1926, pp. 24-25.
42 In contrast to anarcho-communists gathered mainly in Chicago and New York, mostly originating 
from immigrant circles. For broader characterization of the American anarchist movement and its 
fractions, see: J. J. Martin, op. cit., and E. Schuster, Native American Anarchism. A Study of Left-Wing 
American Individualism, New York, NY, Da Capo Press, 1970.
43 W. McElroy, The Debates of Liberty..., op. cit., pp. 51-67. For Stirner’s egoism, see: M. Chmieliński, 
Max Stirner. Jednostka, społeczeństwo, państwo, Kraków, Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006.
44 J. J. Martin, op. cit., p. 199.
45 C. Watner, “Spooner vs. Liberty”, in Libertarian Forum 7, 1975, pp. 5-7 .
46 W. McElroy, The Debates of Liberty..., op. cit., pp. 85-101.
47 L. Spooner, The Law of Intellectual Property or An Essay on the Right of Authors and Inventors to a 
Perpetual Property in Their Ideas, vol. I, Boston, MA, 1855, esp. pp. 77-88.
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Despite	these	fundamental	differences	Spooner	was	highly	respected	in	the	Bos-
ton anarchist circles and vice versa.	The	papers	he	wrote	during	 the	 last	years	of	
his	life	were	clearly	influenced	by	views	of	Tucker	and	his	close	colleagues.48 His 
last	important	work,	an	open	letter	to	the	president	Grover	Cleveland	(1837-1908)	
published by Liberty in nineteen parts, constituting the summary of his intellectual 
achievements, is openly anarchist.49
Lysander Spooner died on May 14th, 1887 in a private apartment in Boston, sur-
rounded	by	his	closest	followers	and	dozens	of	unfinished	manuscripts.50 In a eulogy 
published by Boston Daily Globe, a remarkable Irish poet, essayist and activist, John 
Boyle O’Reilly (1844-1890) referred to Spooner’s death as the greatest loss of the 
US since the death of Ralph Waldo Emerson and predicted that the name of Spooner 
will	be	worshiped	by	millions	as	one	of	the	heroes	of	abolitionism	and	“a	man	whose	
nature	was	so	large	and	his	love	for	humanity	so	great	that	he	distinguished	no	race	
or creed or nationality”.51
3. Massachusetts,	where	Spooner	spent	most	of	his	life,	was	the	first	American	state	
to	abolish	slavery	with	immediate	effect.52	 It	was	also	the	state	where	abolitionist	
views	were	particularly	strong	and	passionate.	It	was	in	Massachusetts,	where	the	
first	mass	organization	advocating	for	emancipation	of	black	people	in	the	USA	–	
New	England	Anti-Slavery	Society	–	was	created.	Both	Spooner’s	parents,	and	pa-
trons	who	supervised	his	legal	practice,	were	abolitionists.	From	his	correspondence	
with	Gerrit	Smith	during	 the	1840s	 it	 is	clear	 that	 the	 issue	of	 the	 legal	 status	of	
slavery	was	of	his	 interest	“for	years,”53	however,	 the	direct	 impulse	 to	write	The 
Unconstitutionality of Slavery, seems to have been the stir in the abolitionist circles 
caused in 1840 due to the disclosure of James Madison’s papers containing a detailed 
report of the debates over slavery held by the participants of the Constitutional Con-
vention.54 For W. L. Garrison and his supporters from the American Anti-Slavery So-
48 J. J. Martin, op. cit., pp. 200-201.
49 L. Spooner,  A Letter to Glover Cleveland, On His False Inaugural Address, the Usurpations and 
Crimes of Lawmakers and Judges and the Consequent Poverty, Ignorance and Servitude of the People, 
Boston, MA, 1886. 
50 B. R. Tucker, “Our Nestor Taken From Us”, in Liberty vol. 4, no. 22, 1887, pp. 4-5.
51 J. B. O’Reilly, “Lysander Spooner: One of the Old Guard of Abolition Heroes, Dies in His Eightieth 
Year After a Fortnight’s Illness”, in Boston Daily Globe, 18.05.1887.
52 Earlier, effective abolition had been conducted in the Vermont Republic, but at that time, it had not 
been a part of the Union. For more information on the history of the emancipation in the Northern states 
of the USA, see: A. Zilversmit, The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North, Chicago, 
IL, University of Chicago Press, 1967.
53 L. Spooner,  A Letter to Gerrit Smith, 08.09.1844, retrieved March 2, 2016 from: http://static1.
squarespace.com/static/55a3c833e4b07c31913e6eae/t/55a41d48e4b0ddaaed6a75e8/1436818760795/
Athol+Mass+Sept+8%2C+1844.pdf
54 W. M. Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848, Ithaca, NY, 
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ciety  Madison Papers constituted indisputable evidence that the Founding Fathers 
made	a	compromise	between	freedom	and	slavery	“granting	to	the	slaveholder	dis-
tinct privileges and protection for his slave property, in return for certain commercial 
concessions	on	his	part	toward	the	North.”55
In	the	light	of	these	revelations,	as	well	as	the	consistent	jurisprudence	of	federal	
courts,	Garrison’s	followers	thought	it	obvious	that	the	US	Constitution	was	clearly	
an	openly	a	pro-slavery	compact	and	anyone	who	swore	to	protect	and	enforce	its	
provisions	“violate[ed]	his	duty	both	as	a	man	and	an	abolitionist.”56 To manifest his 
disdain	for	the	Constitution	Garrison	burnt	a	copy	of	the	supreme	law	of	the	United	
States at the abolitionist convention in Farmingham. While doing it, the publisher of 
The Liberator,	shouted	to	a	rousing	round	of	applause	from	his	followers:	“so	perish	
all	compromises	with	tyranny!”57
The	abolitionists’	disregard	 for	 the	Constitution	was	 further	manifested	by	 the	
fact	that	they	refused	to	take	part	in	elections,	take	on	any	public	offices,58 or in a 
few	cases	in	their	refusal	to	pay	taxes.59 In rejecting the political action, Garrison’s 
supporters	saw	the	chance	of	abolishing	slavery	through	propaganda,	ostracizing	the	
slave-owners	and	boycotting	 their	products,	and	most	of	all,	excluding	states	 that	
sanctioned slavery from the Union.60	Through	this	last	strategy,	they	wished	to	make	
the	North	a	haven	for	runaway	slaves.	By	crossing	the	border	of	the	new	Union,	free	
of	slavery,	the	escaped	slaves	would	be	granted	personal	freedom.	Was	this	process	
to gain a mass character, “peculiar institution” could be abolished on the frontier 
regions	in	a	relatively	short	period	of	time,	and	in	the	long	run	–	in	whole	America.
According to Spooner, the strategy of the abolitionist movement, both in the var-
iant	of	Garrison	and	 reformist	vision	advocated	by	Liberty	Party,	was	doomed	 to	
be fruitless. Propaganda against slavery could not be successful since the Northern 
states	–	the	only	region	where	it	was	possible	to	be	carried	out	freely	–	were	inhab-
ited	by	people	who	no	longer	needed	to	be	convinced	that	slavery	is	evil.	Moreover,	
slave	owners	could	not	be	convinced	en masse to voluntarily give up on all the bene-
Cornell University Press, 1977, p. 239.
55 W. Phillips, (ed.) “The Constitution A Pro-Slavery Compact: or Selections from The Madison 
Papers”, in The Anti-Slavery Examiner, 1845, p. viii.
56 Ibidem.
57 L. Filler, The Crusade Against Slavery 1830-1860, New York, NY, Harper, 1963, pp. 215-216.
58 W. Phillips, Can Abolitionist Vote or Take Office Under the United States Constitution?, New York, 
NY, American Anti-Slavery Society, 1845.
59 Undoubtedly, the most famous example in this regard was Henry David Thoreau. However, he was 
not the only person who refused to pay taxes due to his political views. See: D. M. Gross, We Won’t Pay. 
A Tax Resistance Reader, Createspace, 2008, n.p., pp. 175-220.
60 For more information on the strategies proposed by radical abolitionists gathered around Garrison, 
see: A. S. Kraditor, Means and Ends in American Abolitionism. Garrison and His Critics on Strategy 
and Tactics 1834-1850, Chicago, IL, Ivan R. Dee, 1989.
Włodzimierz Gogłoza From the Constitutional Abolitionism...
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de las Ideas Políticas    
Vol. 19 Núm. 2 (2016): 477-502
488
fits	that	they	enjoyed	thanks	to	the	“peculiar	institution.”61 Liberty Party contributed 
nothing to the cause of emancipation. It did not even have a consistent plan that it 
would	follow	in	case	of	–	according	to	Spooner	highly	improbable	–	victory	in	the	
elections.	And	if	the	actions	undertaken	by	the	members	of	LP	would	be	limited	to	
the attempts to establish amendments to the Constitution, taking into consideration 
complexity	of	such	operation,	abolition	would	be	postponed	so	long	that	most	of	the	
slaves	would	not	live	to	see	that	moment.
Spooner	believed	that	the	only	way	to	achieve	emancipation	of	black	people	in	
America	in	a	reasonably	short	period	of	time	was	to	convince	the	legal	profession	
as	a	whole	that	slavery	is	unconstitutional.	This	strategy	had	proven	successful	in	
his	home	state,	Massachusetts,	where	in	1783	the	Supreme	Court	accepted	the	ar-
guments	of	a	runaway	slave	and	stated	that	slavery	was	incompatible	with	the	state	
constitution	which	granted	that	all	men	were	born	free	and	equal.62
According	to	Spooner,	similar	outcome	was	achievable	at	the	federal	Constitution	
level	as	well.	However,	he	believed	“giving	the	constitution	its	true	construction,	and	
carrying	it	to	effect	necessary.	[It	is	to	be	done]	by	bringing	the	matter	to	the	knowl-
edge	of	the	bar	and	the	bench,	who	are	to	decide	the	questions,	and	to	the	people	
who	are	to	support	them	in	deciding	it	rightly.	It	can	be	done	no	otherwise.”63 For 
Spooner,	whose	professional	career	was	based	on	proving	the	unconstitutionality	of	
regulations	put	upon	banking	and	post	offices,	the	task	of	proving	unconstitutionality	
of	an	institution	that	was	so	deeply	rooted	in	the	American	social	system	as	slavery	
was	a	particularly	alluring	challenge.	The	 result	of	his	efforts	was	a	 two-volume,	
almost	three-hundred-page-long	work	that	came	to	be	known	as	the	most	influential	
analysis of the unconstitutionality of slavery.64
Spooner’s	 arguments	 for	 immediate	 abolishment	of	 slavery	were	highly	origi-
nal.65	Most	 abolitionists	 tried	 to	 prove	 that	 the	 “peculiar	 institution”	was	 incom-
patible	with	natural	law	–	which	they	most	often	derived	from	the	divine	law	–	and	
wished	all	laws	sanctioning	slavery	to	be	declared	void	according	to	the	maxim	lex 
injustia non est lex. The author of The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, while also 
being a iusnaturalist set	out	to	prove	instead	that	slavery	was	an	institution	that	was	
61 L. Spooner,  A Letter to S. P. Andrews, 31.03.1849, retrieved March 2, 2016 from: http://www.
lysanderspooner.org/s/LT48.HTM
62 Massachusetts--Commonwealth v. Jennison (1783), Proc. of Mass. Hist. Soc., Vol. 1873-1875, pp. 
292-295.
63 L. Spooner,  A Letter to Gerrit Smith, 11.01.1847, retrieved March 2, 2016 from: http://static1.
squarespace.com/static/55a3c833e4b07c31913e6eae/t/55a41d7ee4b0114751ba1b81/1436818814110/
LT48.pdf
64 L. Perry, Radical Abolitionism: Anarchy and the Government of God in Antislavery Thought, Ithaca, 
NY, Cornell University Press, 1973, p. 165.
65 R. E. Barnett, “Was Slavery Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth Amendment? Lysander Spooner’s 
Theory of Interpretation”, in Pacific Law Journal 28, 1977, pp. 988-1014.
Włodzimierz Gogłoza From the Constitutional Abolitionism...
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de las Ideas Políticas 
Vol. 19 Núm. 2 (2016): 477-502
489
incompatible	with	the	standing	law	of	the	land.	He	was	convinced	that,	in	order	to	
change the Southern socio-economic system, it is not necessary to change federal 
law,	but	to	interpret	it	correctly.	Therefore	all	the	remarks	that	he	made	in	his	essay	
are, according to him, de lege lata and not de lege ferenda.
In	order	 to	convince	 judges	 that	slave	owners	did	not	have	any	basis	 for	 their	
peculiar institution in the Constitution, Spooner applied the statutory interpretation 
that had been used by the Chief Justice of the United States, John Marshall, in the 
case United States v. Fisher.66	Already	in	his	lifetime,	Marshall	was	named	one	of	
the	most	 influential	American	 lawyers.67	He	was	 respected	 both	 in	 the	Northern,	
as	well	as	Southern	states,	for	his	balanced	views	rejecting	any	kind	of	radicalism.	
As a judge, he avoided voicing his personal opinions in cases involving the issue of 
slavery,	however,	privately	he	was	a	member	of	American	Colonization	Society,	an	
organization that advocated a peculiar solution to the problem of the peculiar insti-
tution – liberating all black slaves under the condition that they immediately return 
to Africa.68 Spooner referred to the interpretation outlined, but not elaborated on in 
the Fisher	case	when	trying	to	prove	that	his	argumentation	was	rooted	in	the	main-
stream	of	the	American	law.69
The case United States v. Fisher did	not	involve	slavery,	but	the	question	whether	
the United States are entitled to priority of payments in all cases of bankruptcy or 
insolvency of a debtor. In the court ruling in this case, Chief Justice Marshall empha-
sized that any limitation of the rights of an individual requires using terminology that 
explicitly	presents	the	purpose	of	the	law-maker:	“Where	fundamental	principles	are	
overthrown,	when	the	general	system	of	the	laws	is	departed	from,	the	legislative	
intention	must	be	expressed	with	irresistible	clearness.”70
According to Spooner, this principle played a key role in the issue of unconsti-
tutionality of slavery since it requires sanctioning slavery either by means of using 
common	and	unambiguous	terms,	or	legal	definitions	that	leave	no	doubts	as	to	their	
meaning71	The	United	States	Constitution	does	not	contain	terms	that	would	explic-
66 L. Spooner,  The Unconstitutionality..., op. cit., p. 63.
67 C. F. Hobson,  The Great Chief Justice. John Marshall and the Rule of Law, Lawrence, KS, University 
Press of Kansas, 1996.
68 E. Burin, Slavery and the Peculiar Solution: A History of the American Colonization Society, 
Gainesville, FL, University Press of Florida, 2005.
69 Spooner did not have a high opinion of judge Marshall. In an open letter to Glover Cleveland, he 
wrote: “John Marshall has the reputation of having been the greatest jurist the country has ever had. 
And he unquestionably would have been a great jurist, if the two fundamental propositions, on which 
all his legal, political, and constitutional ideas were based, had been true. These propositions were, first, 
that government has all power; and, secondly, that the people have no rights.” L. Spooner, A Letter to 
Glover..., op. cit., p. 87.
70 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 2 Cranch 358 358 (1805).
71 L. Spooner,  The Unconstitutionality..., op. cit., pp. 58-66.
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itly refer to slavery including “slaves” or “enslavement.”72 Instead, the authors of 
the	Constitution	used	terms	that	did	not	have	any	legal	definitions,	such	as	“other	
Persons” or “Person held to Service or Labour.”73	These	notions,	contrary	to	what	
supporters of the peculiar institution claimed, could not be considered as references 
to	slavery,	Spooner	argued.	He	claimed	that	this	interpretation	would	be	incompati-
ble	with	their	common	meaning,	as	well	as	with	other	provisions	of	the	Constitution.
In an attempt to interpret the constitutional terms supposedly referring to slavery 
in	the	light	of	“general	principles	of	law	and	reason,”74 Spooner referred to the text 
of the Constitution, court rulings, Blackstone’s commentaries and the common lan-
guage.75	On	the	basis	of	a	thorough	and	painstaking	analysis	that	would	be	later	on	
cited by the Supreme Court of the United States (although in different context),76 he 
concluded	that	constitutional	“other	Persons”	were	inhabitants	of	the	US	who	did	not	
possess	the	citizenship,	and	“Persons	held	to	Service	and	Labour”	were	convicts	and	
debt slaves that constituted majority of American colonists (after excluding Puritans, 
such people constituted almost 2/3 of the early settlers).77 As regards the Article 1, 
§9 of the American Constitution that granted the right to regulate the issue of “the 
migration	or	importation	of	[other]	persons”	to	the	Congress,	Spooner	argued	that	
the term “importation” meant only “to bring from a foreign country, or jurisdiction, 
or	 from	 another	 State,	 into	 one’s	 own	 country,	 jurisdiction	 or	 State”	 and	 did	 not	
have	any	connotation	with	slavery	whatsoever.	“A	man	imports	his	wife	and	chil-
dren	–	but	they	are	not	therefore	his	slaves,	or	capable	of	being	owned	or	sold	as	his	
property. A man imports a gang of laborers, to clear lands, cut canals, or construct 
railroads;	but	not	therefore	to	be	held	as	slaves.	An	innocent	meaning	must	be	given	
to	the	word,	if	it	will	bear	one.	Such	is	the	legal	rule.”78
In his argumentation, Spooner avoids referring to the intentions of the Founding 
Fathers.	From	James	Madison’s	notes	that	were	revealed	in	the	1840s	it	was	clear	
that	most	of	the	Philadelphia	Convention	participants	wished	to	legitimize	slavery	
without	explicitly	referring	to	it	in	the	Constitution.	However,	he claimed that the 
intentions of the authors of the Constitution did not matter for the process of stat-
utory interpretation.79	Indeed,	the	legitimacy	of	the	Constitution	was	not	based	on	
72 The term “slavery” was first used with the introduction of the Thirteenth Amendment.
73 For, respectively, “other persons” and “persons held to service or labor,” see: The Constitution of 
United States Article 1 Section 2 and Article 4 Section 2.
74 This term can be often found in his analysis.
75 Spooner’s method of argumentation is very similar to that propagated in recent years by Richard 
Dworkin,	who	postulated	that	a	judge	as	tirelessly	as	the	ancient	Hercules,	should	refer	to	all	principles	
and	clues	of	interpretation	that	are	part	of	the	legal	system.	See:	R.	Dworkin,	Taking Rights Seriously, 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1977, pp. 105-123.
76 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 US 570 (2008); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 US 3025 (2010).
77 L. Spooner,  The Unconstitutionality..., op. cit., pp. 67-80.
78 Ibidem, p. 82.
79 Ibidem, pp. 114-123. For the analysis of Spooner’s arguments from the perspective of the modern 
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the agreement reached by the participants of the Constitutional Convention, but its 
ratification	by	the	American	people.	The	agreement	of	the	latter	could	not	have	in-
cluded	provisions	kept	secret	from	them.	If	that	was	the	case,	one	could	say	that	the	
law-makers	under	some	secret	agreement	have	the	right	to	impose	duties	on	citizens	
which	 are	 incompatible	with	 the	 common	 understanding	 of	 the	 text	 of	 the	 laws.	
”Any	forty	or	fifty	men,	like	those	who	framed	the	constitution,	may	now	secretly	
concoct another, that is honest in its terms, and yet in secret conclave confess to each 
other the criminal objects they intended to accomplish by it, if its honest character 
should enable them to secure for it the adoption of the people. – But if the people 
should	adopt	such	constitution,	would	they	thereby	adopt	any	of	the	criminal	and	se-
cret purposes of its authors? Or if the guilty confessions of these conspirators should 
be	revealed	fifty	years	afterwards,	would	judicial	tribunals	look	to	them	as	giving	
the	government	any	authority	for	violating	the	legal	meaning	of	the	words	of	such	
constitution, and for so construing them as to subserve the criminal and shameless 
purpose of its originators?”80	Spooner	believed	that	 there	was	only	one	answer	 to	
these	questions	–	the	intentions	of	the	lawmaker	could	be	taken	under	consideration	
while	interpreting	the	law	only	if	they	had	been	clearly	expressed	in	the	text	of	the	
law	in	question,	enabling	those	obliged	to	abide	by	it	to	acknowledge	and	accept	it.	
Since the Founding Fathers had not openly and clearly sanctioned slavery, the secret 
compromise they had achieved had no binding force.
The conclusion of Spooner’s analyses seems clear – the Constitution of the Unit-
ed	States,	contrary	to	the	argumentation	presented	by	Southern	lawyers,	as	well	as	
radical abolitionists, is not a pro-slavery document and it cannot be interpreted as 
providing	legitimacy	for	personal	enslavement.	This	implies	that	judges	who	wish	
to	act	in	accordance	with	the	law	are	required	to	take	stance	for	freedom,	regardless	
of the opinion of majority, common practice or the socio-political consequences of 
widespread	emancipation.81
The Unconstitutionality of Slavery	attracted	widespread	interest	in	the	abolition-
ist circles. Spooner’s arguments received particularly favourable response from the 
moderate fraction of the emancipation movement represented by the Liberty Party. 
During	the	party	convention	in	1849,	it	was	decided	that	members	of	the	party	would	
provide	each	lawyer	in	the	US	with	a	copy	of	the	essay.	Additionally,	the	leaders	of	
LP,	who	were	mostly	 rich	businessmen	and	philanthropists,	offered	distribute	 the	
book,	by	means	of	their	private	networks,	to	people	outside	the	legal	profession.	
Further	publicity	of	Spooner’s	argumentation	was	a	result	of	the	stance	expressed	
by	Frederick	Douglass,	 a	 runaway	 slave	 and	 one	 of	 the	 closest	 supporters	 of	W.	
legal theory, see: e.g. H. W. Baade, ”’Original Intent’ in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses”, 
in Texas Law Review 69, 1991, pp. 1046-1051.
80 L. Spooner,  The Unconstitutionality..., op. cit., p. 118.
81 Ibidem, p. 14.
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L.	Garrison,	who,	distancing	himself	from	the	editor	of	The Liberator, declared in 
several abolitionist papers that after reading The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, he 
arrived	at	the	conclusion	that:	“the	Constitution,	construed	in	the	light	of	well	estab-
lished	rules	of	legal	interpretation,	might	be	made	consistent	in	its	details	with	the	
noble	purposes	avowed	in	its	preamble;	and	that	hereafter	we	should	insist	upon	the	
application	of	such	rules	to	that	instrument,	and	demand	that	it	be	wielded	in	behalf	
of emancipation.”82
Not	all	abolitionists	were	equally	positive	about	Spooner’s	theses.	As	a	reaction	
to	the	growing	popularity	of	 the	argumentation,	Wendell	Phillips	(1811-1884)	–	a	
lawyer	from	Garrison’s	circles	–	published	a	thorough	critique	of	The Unconstitu-
tionality of Slavery	with	the	help	of	American	Anti-Slavery	Society.	He	argued	that	
Spooner	was	wrong	about	the	constitutional	status	of	slavery	and	following	the	strat-
egy	which	the	latter	proposed	would	lead	the	abolitionist	movement	to	an	inevitable	
failure.83	He	believed	 that	some	of	Spooner’s	postulates	were	a	 threat	not	only	 to	
slavery itself, but also to the fundamental principles of the American legal system, 
languishing on the edge of anarchism.
The	most	threatening	argument	presented	by	Spooner	was,	according	to	Phillips,	
that	judges	and	other	public	figures	were	obliged	to	disregard	the	opinion	of	majority	
and	interpret	all	laws	with	the	presumption	in	favour	of	liberty:	“An	individual	may,	
and	ought	to	resign	his	office,	rather	than	assist	in	a	law	he	deems	unjust.	But	while	
he	retains,	under	the	majority,	one	of	their	offices,	he	retains	it	on	their	conditions,	
which	 are,	 to	 obey	 and	 enforce	 their	 decrees.	There	 can	be	 no	more	 self-evident	
proposition,	 than	 that,	 in	 every	 [legitimate]	Government,	 the	majority	must	 rule,	
and	their	will	be	uniformly	obeyed.	Now,	if	the	majority	enact	a	wicked	law,	and	the	
Judge	refuses	to	enforce	it,	which	is	to	yield,	the	Judge,	or	the	majority?	Of	course,	
the	first.	On	any	other	supposition,	Government	is	impossible.	Indeed,	Mr.	Spooner’s	
idea is practical no-governntentism.”84
Phillip’s	 accusation	 that	 the	presumption	of	 liberty	was	 equal	 to	 rejecting	any	
form	of	power	was	harshly	criticized	by	Spooner	himself.	In	the	second	volume	of	
The Unconstitutionality of Slavery he argued that the government based on uncondi-
tional	respect	for	inherent	rights	of	an	individual	was	not	only	possible	to	establish,	
but also the only one that could be normatively legitimized. Indeed, only this kind 
of	government	could	be	constituted	with	the	consent	and	for	the	benefit	of	the	citi-
zens.	”Protecting	the	rights	of	all,	it	would	naturally	secure	the	cordial	support	of	all,	
instead	of	a	part	only.	The	expense	of	maintaining	it	would	be	far	less	than	that	of	
maintaining	a	different	one.	And	it	would	certainly	be	much	more	practicable	to	live	
under	it	than	under	any	other.	Indeed,	this	is	the	only	government	which	it	is	practi-
82 F. Douglass, Change of …, op. cit., p. 155.
83 W. Phillips, Review of Lysander..., op. cit., p. 4 and following.
84 Ibidem, pp. 9-10.
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cable	to	establish	by	the	consent	of	all	the	governed;	for	an	unjust	government	must	
have victims, and the victims cannot be supposed to give their consent. All govern-
ments, therefore, that profess to be founded on the consent of the governed, and yet 
have	authority	to	violate	natural	laws,	are	necessarily	frauds.	It	is	not	a	supposable	
case, that all, or even any very large part, of the governed, can have agreed to them. 
Justice is evidently the only principle that everybody can be presumed to agree to, in 
the formation of government.”85	In	the	following	years,	this	remark	that	used	to	be	a	
marginal	argument	in	a	much	broader	debate	would	become	a	central	point	in	Spoon-
er’s legal and political doctrine. It seems that the direct cause of the evolution of 
his	views	towards	anarchism	was	the	bloodiest	conflict	on	the	history	of	the	United	
States	–	the	war	between	the	North	and	the	South	over	the	right	to	leave	the	Union.
4. The American Civil War is considered the turning point in the history of the US.86 
As	George	Ticknor	(1791-1871),	a	remarkable	 literature	scholar,	wrote	soon	after	
it	was	finished,	“it	does	not	seem	to	me	as	if	I	were	living	in	the	country	in	which	I	
was	born.”87	The	war	was	the	cause	of	death	of	625	thousand	up	to	even	850	thou-
sand people, complete destruction of the Southern states88 and a great increase in the 
power	of	the	federal	government.89 Even the language that Americans used to refer 
to	their	country	was	changed	–	the	term	“union”	suggesting	a	voluntary	association	
of	different	jurisdictions	was	substituted	by	“nation”	and	for	the	first	time,	the	Unit-
ed	States	themselves	were	considered	a	singular	entity	in	terms	of	grammar	(people	
started using the form The United States is..., instead of The United States are...).90
However,	 along	with	 the	 huge	 number	 of	 casualties	 and	 enormous	 economic	
cost,	the	war	resulted	in	granting	personal	freedom	for	almost	four	millions	of	black	
people	living	in	America.	Its	direct	consequence	was	adopting	three	Amendments	
to the Constitution that abolished the “peculiar institution” completely – the 13th 
abolished slavery, the 14th granted citizenship to former slaves and the 15th banned 
limiting the right to vote on the basis of race, skin color or the previous condition 
of	servitude.	For	most	abolitionists,	adopting	these	Amendments	was	the	crowning	
of their long-lasting efforts, a reason for personal satisfaction, and often a reason 
85 L. Spooner,  The Unconstitutionality... Part Second, op. cit., p. 143.
86 J. R. Hummel,  Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men. A History of the American Civil War, 
Chicago, IL, Open Court, 1996, pp. 349-365.
87 G. Ticknor,  A Letter to George T. Curtis, 30.06.1869, in A. Ticknor, G. S. Hillard (eds.), Life, Letters, 
and Journals of George Ticknor, vol. 2, Boston, MA, University of Michigan Library, 1876, p. 485.
88 The American Civil War is often considered the first modern total war. See: e . g.  D.  G. Faust, This 
Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War, New York, NY, Vintage, 2008.
89 J. R. Hummel, op. cit., pp. 313-348.
90 J. M. McPherson,  Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, New York, NY, McGraw-Hill 
Education, 1982, p. 488.
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to	withdraw	 from	 the	 socio-political	 activity	 altogether.91	Those,	who	had	 argued	
that	slavery	was	unconstitutional,	were	particularly	satisfied	since	their	opinions	had	
a	great	 influence	upon	 the	 substance	of	 the	14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.92	However,	Spooner,	who	provided	the	constitutional	abolitionists	with	
their	most	powerful	arguments,	was	far	from	feeling	satisfaction	that	his	colleagues	
felt.	He	thought	that	 the	Civil	War	did	not	result	 in	the	widespread	emancipation,	
but	it	merely	substituted	personal	enslavement	with	political	enslavement.	What	is	
more, the latter one affected a much greater number of people, making the slavery 
rate increase.93
Spooner analyzed the Civil War and its consequences in a series of three essays 
published in 1967-1870 titled No Treason.94 The	 thesis	 presented	 in	 them	was	
contrarian	and	iconoclastic:	it	was	not	the	South	that	betrayed	the	Union,	but	the	
Union betrayed Americans by trying to keep the South by force. “The pretense 
that	the	«abolition	of	slavery»	was	either	a	motive	or	justification	for	the	war,	is	
a	fraud	of	the	same	character	with	that	of	«maintaining	the	national	honor»	Who,	
but such usurpers, robbers, and murderers as they, ever established slavery? Or 
what	government,	except	one	resting	upon	the	sword,	like	the	one	we	now	have,	
was	ever	capable	of	maintaining	slavery?	And	why	did	these	men	abolish	slavery?	
Not from any love of liberty in general – not as an act of justice to the black man 
himself,	but	only	«as	a	war	measure»	and	because	they	wanted	his	assistance,	and	
that	 of	 his	 friends,	 in	 carrying	 on	 the	war	 they	 had	 undertaken	 for	maintaining	
and	intensifying	that	political,	commercial,	and	industrial	slavery,	to	which	they	
have	subjected	the	great	body	of	the	people,	both	black	and	white.	And	yet	these	
imposters	now	cry	out	 that	 they	have	abolished	 the	chattel	 slavery	of	 the	black	
man	–	although	that	was	not	the	motive	of	the	war	–	as	if	they	thought	they	could	
thereby	conceal,	atone	for,	or	justify	that	other	slavery	which	they	were	fighting	
to	perpetuate,	and	to	render	more	rigorous	and	inexorable	than	it	ever	was	before.	
There	was	no	difference	of	principle	–	but	only	of	degree	–	between	the	slavery	
they	boast	they	have	abolished,	and	the	slavery	they	were	fighting	to	preserve;	for	
all restraints upon men’s natural liberty, not necessary for the simple maintenance 
of justice, are of the nature of slavery, and differ from each other only in degree. 
If their object had really been to abolish slavery, or maintain liberty or justice gen-
erally,	they	had	only	to	say:	All,	whether	white	or	black,	who	want	the	protection	
of	this	government,	shall	have	it;	and	all	who	do	not	want	it,	will	be	left	in	peace,	
so	 long	as	 they	leave	us	 in	peace.	Had	they	said	 this,	slavery	would	necessarily	
91 After the ratification of the last Amendment in 1870, the AASS officially dissolved.
92 R. E. Barnett, “Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment”. 
In: Journal of Legal Analysis 3, 2011, pp. 165–263.
93 L. Spooner, No Treason I, op. cit., p. 5.
94 It was first meant to be divided into six parts – hence the surprising order: I, II and VI.
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have	been	abolished	at	once;	the	war	would	have	been	saved;	and	a	thousand	times	
nobler	union	than	we	have	ever	had	would	have	been	the	result.”95
The starting point for Spooner’s argument is specifying the character of the Un-
ion	formed	in	1787	by	the	citizens	of	America	and	defining	the	constitutional	mean-
ing of the term “treason” (Article III § 3).96 Based on the history of the American 
colonies’ struggle for independence and the preamble to the Constitution, he argued 
that	the	United	States	were	created	by	the	voluntary	consent	of	Americans	who	chose	
and	established	the	government.	However,	the	text	of	the	constitutional	agreement	
did not state that the parties involved – be that individuals as claimed by Spooner 
or	states	as	maintained	by	the	constitutionalists	from	the	South	–	were	bound	by	its	
provisions	for	a	certain,	specified,	period	of	time.	What	is	more,	for	that	agreement	to	
be	considered	voluntary,	it	should	be	possible	to	terminate	it	at	any	time.	This	is	why	
the author of No Treason maintained that the citizens of the South had every right to 
withdraw	from	the	agreement	making	them	a	part	of	the	Union	and	a	subject	to	the	
shared government. Therefore, by disobeying the federal government they did not 
commit	treason.	When	fighting	against	it,	they	were	doing	so	not	as	frauds,	betrayers	
or	false	friends	–	synonyms	of	traitors	that	Spooner	presented	in	accordance	with	his	
rule of interpreting constitutional terms as in the common language and daily use – 
but as enemies.97	The	actual	traitors,	according	to	Spooner,	were	the	government	of	
the Union, since by making it impossible for the Southerners to secede, they violated 
the	assumption	that	their	power	was	based	on	the	consent	of	the	governed.	In	fact,	
their	authority	was	based	only	on	the	consent	of	those	whose	support	was	necessary	
to keep all others dependent on their mercy. Spooner thought the postbellum United 
States	to	be	“a	mere	conspiracy	of	the	strong	against	the	weak.”98
That conclusion, according to Spooner, called for revaluation of the normative 
basis	of	power	which	could	reveal	that	not	only	the	government,	but	also	the	Consti-
tution	from	which	the	government	derives	its	authority,	lacked	legitimacy.	“Previous	
to	the	war,	 there	were	some	grounds	for	saying	that	–	in	theory,	at	 least,	 if	not	 in	
practice	–	our	government	was	a	free	one;	that	it	rested	on	consent.	But	nothing	of	
that	kind	can	be	said	now,	if	the	principle	on	which	the	war	was	carried	on	by	the	
95 Idem,  No Treason VI..., op. cit., p. 86.
96 Idem,  No Treason II…, op. cit., pp. 17-30. The article of the Constitution that Spooner referred to: 
“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to 
their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the 
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. The Congress shall 
have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of 
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.”
97 Ibidem, pp. 27-30.
98 Ibidem, p. 30  No Treason is not a defense of the Confederate States of America, but of the right of 
self-determination inherent to each individual. Spooner believed that the lack of coercion was the sine 
qua non condition for the legitimacy of the government based on the rule of law and both the North and 
the South violated this principle. Ibidem, p. 28.
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North [that men may rightfully be compelled to submit to, and support, a govern-
ment	that	they	do	not	want;	and	that	resistance,	on	their	part,	makes	them	traitors	
and	criminals],	is	irrevocably	established.	If	that	principle	be	not	the	principle	of	the	
Constitution,	the	fact	should	be	known.	If	it	be	the	principle	of	the	Constitution,	the	
Constitution	itself	should	be	at	once	overthrown.”99 In order to indicate the limits 
of the social compact that establishes the legitimate government, in No Treason, 
Spooner	attempted	to	identify	the	requirements	that	should	be	fulfilled	by	the	Con-
stitution	to	be	considered	normatively	legitimized	and	then	checked	whether	the	US	
Constitution	fulfilled	those	requirements.
According to Spooner, the only Constitution that could be considered legitimate 
was	the	one	that	constituted	a	voluntary	agreement	signed	by	specific	individuals,	
on	their	own	behalf	and	within	their	rights	to	peacefully	govern	oneself	and	one’s	
wealth.	The	consent	of	the	parties	must	be	stated	explicitly	and	approved	in	a	man-
ner	that	would	be	verifiable	in	the	future,	e.g.	by	signing,	and	be	free	of	any	kind	of	
coercion.	If	individuals	constituting	it	wished	to	extend	it	to	include	third	parties	–	
constitutional the people	–	that	do	not	wish	to	become	a	part	of	this	endeavor,	their	
actions should be considered violence and they should be regarded as thugs. Indeed, 
no individual has the right to force others to take on commitments that they do not 
give	their	consent	to.	In	the	same	way	that	one	cannot	force	others	to	enter	a	mar-
riage, a business agreement or a church, one cannot force other to become a part of a 
constitutional	agreement.	As	Spooner	claimed,	“There	is	no	other	criterion	whatever,	
by	which	to	determine	whether	a	government	is	a	free	one,	or	not,	than	the	single	one	
of its depending, or not depending, solely on voluntary support.”100
The preamble to the Constitution of the United States includes a statement that 
it	has	been	constituted	and	adopted	by	the	citizens	of	the	US	with	the	aim	of	grant-
ing blessing of liberty for themselves and their offspring, strengthening the Union, 
establishing justice, ensuring domestic tranquility and providing for the common 
defense. Prima facie this declaration indicates that the normative legitimacy of the 
agreement constituting the Union is founded upon the consent of Americans. Ac-
cording	 to	 Spooner	 however,	 the	 doctrine	 of	popular sovereignty	 which	was	 the	
basis for the American republic101 is a very dangerous myth since it suggests the 
existence	of	the	common	consent	in	the	time	when	it	could	not	have	been	reached,	
and the possibility of including the future generations that at the time of concluding 
the	agreement	were	not	even	born	yet.102
99 Ibidem, p. 6.
100  Ibidem, p. 27.
101  See: E. S. Morgan, Inventing the People. The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America, 
New York, NY, W. W. Norton & Company, 1988.
102  L. Spooner, No Treason II…, op. cit., p. 25 and idem, No Treason VI…, op. cit., pp. 43-48.
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The doctrine of popular sovereignty that Founding Fathers referred to assumes 
that	the	legitimate	governments	are	granted	“their	just	powers	from	the	consent	of	
the governed.”103	However,	during	the	state	conventions	that	ratified	the	US	Consti-
tution	only	few	citizens	had	the	right	to	vote.	Women,	juveniles,	black	slaves	and	
debt	slaves	were	not	asked	for	their	consent.	Even	among	white	males,	who	consti-
tuted	the	majority	at	the	ratification	conventions,	not	all	had	the	right	to	vote	since	
many	states	established	highly	restrictive	property	qualifications.	As	a	consequence,	
the	majority	of	Americans	were	bound	by	an	agreement	on	whose	provisions	they	
did	not	have	any	influence	whatsoever,	their	acceptance	thereof	was	of	no	interest	
to	anyone,	nor	did	 it	matter	 to	anybody	 if	 they	wished	 to	 reject	 it.	Therefore,	 the	
popular consent of We the people on establishing the United States as designed in the 
Constitution	was	a	fiction	even	in	the	times	of	the	Founding	Fathers.
Even	if,	contrary	to	sources,	we	were	to	assume	that	the	federal	Constitution	was	
ratified	and	accepted	by	the	people	and	not	only	a	small	minority,	it	would	still	lose	
its	legitimacy	with	the	death	of	those	who	ratified	it,	as	Spooner	claimed.104 They did 
not have the right to make its provisions binding for next generations. Their declara-
tion	that	the	Constitution	was	established	to	ensure	the	blessings	of	liberty	for	them-
selves and their offspring is as binding as the hopes of parents building a house that 
one	day	at	least	one	of	their	adult	children	would	wish	to	live	in	it.	They	can	make	
the	house	attractive	in	order	to	influence	the	decision	of	their	children	to	voluntarily	
stay there, but they do not have the right to force them to do so.105
The	offspring	of	the	citizens	of	the	United	States	who	established	the	Union	by	
the end of the 18th	century	were	never	asked	for	giving	their	opinion	on	the	Con-
stitution and therefore their consent to bear its provisions could be only presumed. 
Anticipating harsh criticism from the supporters of popular sovereignty, Spooner ar-
gued that the only actions that could establish presumed consent of the individuals to 
become	subjects	to	the	constitutional	power	would	be	participation	in	the	elections	
and/or	paying	taxes.	However,	none	of	these	could	be	considered	a	proof	of	volun-
tarily supporting the Union.106
103  The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America. Washington, 
DC 2002, p. 9.
104  L. Spooner, No Treason VI…, op. cit., p. 36.
105  Ibidem, p. 34.
106 Ibidem, pp. 33-48. Spooner does not take into consideration other popular forms of presumed 
consent, such as long-termed inhabiting the territory of a given state or using the public services 
offered by the state. However, these examples can be found in the works of one of the most influential 
exponent of Spooner’s theses, an American constitutionalist, Randy Barnett. See: esp. R. E. Barnett, 
“Constitutional Legitimacy”, in Columbia Law Review 103, 2003, pp. 111-148 and Idem, Restoring 
the Lost Constitution. The Presumption of Liberty, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2004, 
pp. 9-31. For a broader analysis of the issue of legitimacy of political power in the context of different 
views on the social compact see: M. Huemer, The Problem of Political Authority. An Examination of the 
Right to Coerce and the Duty to Obey, New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 20-80.
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With regards to taxation, Spooner points out the obvious fact that the public trib-
utes	 are	 compulsory.	 People	who	 are	 obliged	 to	 pay	 them	have	 no	 possibility	 of	
refusing to do so. Those subjected to taxation are in a similar situation to that of a 
victim	of	 the	 robbery.	“The	 fact	 is	 that	 the	government,	 like	a	highwayman,	says	
to a man: «Your money, or your life» And many, if not most, taxes are paid under 
the	compulsion	of	that	threat.	The	government	does	not,	indeed,	waylay	a	man	in	a	
lonely place, spring upon him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol to his head, 
proceed	to	rifle	his	pockets.	But	the	robbery	is	none	the	less	a	robbery	on	that	ac-
count;	and	it	is	far	more	dastardly	and	shameful.”107 Acting under the threat of force 
or actual force ipso facto excludes the possibility of refusing to take the particular 
action, hence, paying taxes can never be treated – if there is no other clear and ex-
plicit	declaration	–	as	support	for	constitutional	power.
Voting cannot be considered manifestation of such support either. Spooner presents 
several arguments for this thesis. Firstly, not all citizens of the US had the right to vote,108 
hence the fact that the elections are held regularly does not mean that the government 
chosen	through	them	has	the	support	of	all	individuals	that	are	subjects	to	their	power.	
Secondly,	a	large	part	of	those	who	have	the	right	to	vote,	do	not	participate	in	the	pro-
cess,	which	does	not	mean	that	they	give	consent	to	become	subjects	to	the	choice	made	
by	other	people.	Their	absence	could	be	a	purposeful	manifestation	against	power	itself.	
Those,	who	vote	only	occasionally,	could	do	so	in	order	to	support	a	particular	person	
or	to	minimize	the	chances	of	the	victory	of	a	candidate	whose	postulates	they	consider	
particularly harmful. Even regular participation in the process cannot be considered a 
proof	of	support	for	the	people	in	power,	because	due	to	the	use	of	the	secret	ballot,	
it	is	not	certain	for	whom	(or	what)	or	against	whom	(what)	they	voted	and	what	was	
their reason. According to Spooner, this last remark is particularly important since some 
voters can treat voting as the only form of self-defense available in a democratic state. 
The author of No Treason	presents	an	analogy	with	a	battlefield.	Just	because	a	person	
thrown	into	the	middle	of	a	battle	shoots	aiming	at	the	other	side	of	the	conflict	it	does	
not	mean	they	support	the	country	whose	troops	they	find	themselves	in	–	it	only	means	
they	are	trying	to	survive.	Similarly,	some	voters	may	find	themselves	in	a	situation	
where	they	are	living	under	the	government	that	they	did	not	give	their	consent	to	and	
that they cannot confront effectively. “Doubtless the most miserable of men, under the 
most	oppressive	government	in	the	world,	if	allowed	the	ballot,	would	use	it,	if	they	
could	see	any	chance	of	thereby	meliorating	their	condition.	But	it	would	not,	therefore,	
be	a	legitimate	inference	that	the	government	itself,	that	crushes	them,	was	one	which	
they had voluntarily set up, or even consented to.”109
107  L. Spooner, No Treason VI..., op. cit., p. 43.
108  At the time when Spooner published the essay, only about one sixth of the American population had 
the right to vote.
109  Ibidem, p. 38.
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Therefore,	Spooner	believes	the	presumed	consent,	which	is	the	foundation	for	
the popular sovereignty doctrine, to be the instrument of enslavement – a fraud by 
means	of	which	people	 in	power	and	 those	who	owe	their	privileged	positions	 to	
the	support	they	get	from	the	government,	like	bankers	who	benefit	from	the	mon-
ey monopoly established in their interest,110 subjugate individuals unable to oppose 
their	power	effectively.	This	kind	of	“shameless	absurdity,	 falsehood,	 impudence,	
robbery, usurpation, tyranny, and villainy of every kind” cannot constitute the basis 
for the legitimacy of the government.111 According to Spooner, a street thug might as 
well	claim	that	he	has	the	right	to	presume	that	a	traveler	gives	his	consent	to	share	
his	money	with	him.112 In fact, the government is even more perverse than a street 
thugs, since the latter do not usurp the support for their actions and do not claim 
that their crimes are committed in the interest of the victims of their violence. ”The 
highwayman	takes	solely	upon	himself	the	responsibility,	danger,	and	crime	of	his	
own	act.	He	does	not	pretend	that	he	has	any	rightful	claim	to	your	money,	or	that	
he	intends	to	use	it	for	your	own	benefit.	He	does	not	pretend	to	be	anything	but	a	
robber. He has not acquired impudence enough to profess to be merely a «protector» 
and	that	he	takes	men’s	money	against	their	will,	merely	to	enable	him	to	«protect»	
those	infatuated	travellers,	who	feel	perfectly	able	to	protect	themselves,	or	do	not	
appreciate his peculiar system of protection. He is too sensible a man to make such 
professions as these. Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you, as you 
wish	him	to	do.	He	does	not	persist	in	following	you	on	the	road,	against	your	will;	
assuming to be your rightful «sovereign» on account of the «protection» he affords 
you.	He	does	 not	 keep	«protecting»	you,	 by	 commanding	you	 to	 bow	down	 and	
serve	him;	by	requiring	you	to	do	this,	and	forbidding	you	to	do	that;	by	robbing	
you	of	more	money	as	often	as	he	finds	it	for	his	interest	or	pleasure	to	do	so;	and	by	
branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and shooting you 
down	without	mercy,	if	you	dispute	his	authority,	or	resist	his	demands.	He	is	too	
much of a gentleman to be guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villainies as 
these. In short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either 
his dupe or his slave.”113
Basing on his analysis, Spooner concludes that the Constitution of the United 
States has no binding force. Taking into consideration that only a minor part of 
Americans	supported	its	ratification,	it	was	not	binding	even	at	 the	moment	of	its	
ratification	and	it	 is	obvious	 that	 it	could	not	be	binding	after	 the	American	Civil	
War,	when	the	Southerners	were	forcibly	refused	the	possibility	of	leaving	the	Un-
ion.	As	Spooner	concludes,	“it	is	plain,	then,	that	on	general	principles	of	law	and	
110  Ibidem, pp. 81-85.
111  Idem, No Treason II..., op. cit., p. 30  
112  Ibidem, pp. 30-31.
113  Idem, No Treason VI..., op. cit., p. 44.
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reason	–	such	principles	as	we	all	act	upon	in	courts	of	justice	and	in	common	life	
–	the	Constitution	is	no	contract;	that	it	binds	nobody,	and	never	did	bind	anybody;	
and	that	all	those	who	pretend	to	act	by	its	authority,	are	really	acting	without	any	
legitimate	authority	at	 all;	 that,	on	general	principles	of	 law	and	 reason,	 they	are	
mere usurpers, and that everybody not only has the right, but is morally bound, to 
treat them as such.”114
5. During	the	quarter	of	a	century	between	the	publication	of	the	first	volume	of	The 
Unconstitutionality of Slavery and No Treason VI: The Constitution of No Authority, 
one	can	clearly	see	a	radical	change	in	views	of	the	author.	The	Constitution	that	be-
fore	the	Civil	War	he	thought	to	be	the	tool	of	the	widespread	emancipation	loses	all	
its utility. Although he still believes it better than “it has generally been assumed to 
be” and for any departures from the liberal values expressed in its preamble blames 
the government, that through “false interpretations, and naked usurpations” corrupt-
ed its meaning, postbellum he arrives at the conclusion that in the light of maintain-
ing	the	Union	by	force,	it	is	perhaps	of	no	importance	what	its	true	legal	meaning,	
as a contract, is115.	“But	whether	the	Constitution	really	be	one	thing,	or	another,	this	
much	is	certain	–	that	it	has	either	authorized	such	a	government	as	we	have	had,	
or	has	been	powerless	to	prevent	it.	In	either	case,	it	is	unfit	to	exist.”116 The change 
in	Spooner’s	views	is	not	concerned	with	the	issue	of	how	to	properly	interpret	the	
Constitution,	but	whether	it	is	an	efficient	instrument	for	protection	of	the	rights	of	
an individual. The author of The Unconstitutionality of Slavery abandoned the belief 
in	the	statute	law	and	in	the	possibility	that	it	can	be	used	to	achieve	goals	other	than	
promoting the interests of plutocrats.117
Before the Civil War, despite having many reservations over the political and 
legal	system	of	the	US,	Spooner	seemed	willing	to	admit	that	the	Constitution	was	
designed to realize the values expressed in the preamble, and that it could be used 
to	protect	inherent	rights	of	an	individual	on	the	condition	that	it	was	interpreted	in	
accordance	with	the	presumption	of	liberty.	However,	after	the	War,	while	observing	
the	ongoing	Reconstruction,	during	which	the	US	went	through	a	radical	political	
transformation,	he	came	to	the	conclusion	that	when	lawmakers	refer	to	the	constitu-
tional	values,	it	is	only	to	hide	the	fact	that	the	laws	they	ratify	are	designed	to	protect	
the	interests	of	those	in	power	and	their	clients.	
Postbellum, Spooner begins to see the norms and institutions that he attacked 
before	the	conflict	as	incompatible	with	rights	and	freedoms	provided	by	the	Consti-
114  Ibidem, p. 55.
115 Ibidem, p. 88.
116  Ibidem, p. 88.
117  See: R. T. Long, Inside and Outside Spooner’s Natural Law Jurisprudence, 2007, pp. 24-25, a 
lecture given during the 23rd Internationale Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Kraków 1-7 
VIII, retrieved March 4, 2016, from: http://praxeology.net/Spooner-Krakow.doc
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tution – such as slavery or the money monopoly – not as incidental departures from 
liberal values, but as the manifestation of the real nature of the legal system and a 
proof	that	the	system	is	based	on	force	and	violence.	Violence	cannot	however	pro-
vide	a	normative	legitimacy	for	the	state	that	is	supposedly	based	on	the	rule	of	law.	
As	he	stated	even	before	the	Civil	War,	“if	the	majority,	however	large,	of	the	people	
of	a	country,	enter	into	a	contract	of	government,	called	a	constitution,	by	which	they	
agree to aid, abet or accomplish any kind of injustice, or to destroy or invade the 
natural	rights	of	any	person	or	persons	whatsoever,	whether	such	persons	be	parties	
to	the	compact	or	not,	this	contract	of	government	is	unlawful	and	void	–	and	for	the	
same	reason	that	a	treaty	between	two	nations	for	a	similar	purpose,	or	a	contract	
of	the	same	nature	between	two	individuals,	is	unlawful	and	void.	Such	a	contract	
of government has no moral sanction. It confers no rightful authority upon those 
appointed to administer it. It confers no legal or moral rights, and imposes no legal 
or	moral	obligation	upon	the	people	who	are	parties	 to	 it.	The	only	duties,	which	
anyone	can	owe	to	it,	or	to	the	government	established	under	color	of	its	authority,	
are disobedience, resistance, destruction.”118
This	conclusion	is	in	line	with	the	views	of	radical	abolitionists,	who	called	for	
breaking	up	any	 relationship	with	 the	government	established	 in	accordance	with	
the	Constitution	that	allowed	for	the	existence	of	slavery.	According	to	Garrison	and	
his colleagues, the only proper response to the violence that is inherent to any legal 
system	that	allows	for	treating	people	as	property	is	disobeying	the	law	and	acting	in	
accordance	with	the	Christian	principle	of	love	of	one’s	neighbor.	As	he	wrote	more	
than a decade before the Thoreau’s Concord lectures on the duties of an individual in 
relation	to	the	unjust	government,	he	did	not	care	for	what	the	statutory	law	required	
from	him,	nor	what	it	banned,	since	“there	is	no	other	source	of	laws	than	the	Bible,”	
however,	if	he	breaks	the	statutory	law,	“[he]	will	submit	to	the	penalty,	unresisting-
ly, in imitation of Christ, and his apostles, and the holy martyrs.”119 
This	view	was	 later	extended	by	Garrison	onto	 the	doctrine	of non-resistance, 
which	called	for	abolitionist	to	carry	their	actions	completely	outside	the	political	
system,	and	if	necessary	–	against	it,	however,	on	the	condition	that	they	do	not	en-
gage in any violence themselves.120
Spooner	was	never	a	pacifist,	nor	did	he	derive	the	natural	law	from	the	Bible,121 
but	 he	 agreed	with	Garrison	 and	his	 followers	 that	 institutionalized	violence,	 i.e.	
slavery,	did	not	deserve	to	be	regarded	as	the	law	and	needed	to	be	disobeyed.	The	
difference	between	the	author	of	The Unconstitutionality of Slavery and the aboli-
tionist circles gathered around the editor of The Liberator	was	that	while	the	major-
118  L. Spooner, The Unconstitutionality..., op. cit., p. 9.
119  H. Mayer, op. cit., p. 224.
120  See: A. S. Kraditor, op. cit., passim.
121  R. T. Long, op. cit., pp. 26-30.
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ity of Garrison’s colleagues rejected the normative legitimacy of the Constitution 
before	the	Civil	War,	stating	that	it	was	a	“pro-slavery	document,”	Spooner	refused	
to	give	it	any	“authority”	after	the	War,	which	turned	it	–	contrary	to	the	values	stated	
in	its	preamble	–	into	an	instrument	in	the	hands	of	politicians	who	wished	to	sub-
stitute	the	unconstitutional	personal	slavery	with	a	common	“political,	commercial,	
and industrial slavery.”122
122  L. Spooner, No Treason VI..., op. cit., p. 86.
